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TOTAL CONCEPT AND FEEL OR DISSECTION?:




The United States Constitution allows Congress to pass laws "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... "I The first copyright laws were enacted
by Congress in 17902 and, today, under the Copyright Act of 1976,3 au-
thors may receive copyright protection if their work is: 1) an original
work of authorship; and 2) fixed in a tangible medium of expression,
where it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.
4
The underlying premise of copyright law is that progress of the arts is
promoted by granting talented creators, for a limited time, exclusive con-
trol over their creations.5 Thus, copyright law provides authors with the
incentive to create works and, after a period of protection, permits the
public free access to these works.6
Copyright protection commences at the time of the work's creation.
7
Registration has some impact on the remedies provided to the copyright
owner,8 but these formalities do not involve any substantive evaluation of
the work. The ease with which a party obtains copyright protection
* J.D., 1993, University of Nebraska College of Law. Ms. Macatee will be joining the law
firm of FuIbright & Jaworski in Houston, Texas in August, 1993. This Note won first place in the
1992 ASCAP Nathan Burkan Memorial competition at UNL and has been entered in the national
competition. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Denicola and Steve Thomas for their
thoughtful comments.
I. U.S. Corsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5660. Revisions of the Copyright Act were enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976. Id.
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
4. Id. § 102(a).
5. See H.R. REP. 1476, supra note 2, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660.
6. See, eg., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(Copyright protection "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors.., by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.").
7. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
8. For example, the owner cannot sue for infringement unless the work has been registered.
Id. § 411. In addition, statutory damages and attorney's fees may not be available for infringing acts
which occurred before registration. Id. § 412.
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stands in sharp contrast to the procedural aspects that must be overcome
to obtain either a federal trademark or patent.9 Once a work is protected
by a valid copyright, an author can maintain a cause of action against
unauthorized use of the work. 10 To demonstrate copyright infringement,
a plaintiff must establish that: 1) he or she owns the valid copyright in
question; 2) defendant copied plaintiff's work or had access to the copy-
righted work affording defendant an opportunity to copy plaintiff's
work; and 3) substantial similarity exists between the two works.1' The
issues of copyright ownership and access are typically not difficult to re-
solve. Thus, it is the issue of substantial similarity that lies at the heart of
many infringement claims, and-as one commentator has observed-
"[s]ubstantial similarity is difficult, if not impossible, to define.' 2 Pro-
fessor Melville Nimmer has articulated the concept of substantial simi-
larity in the following manner:
It is clear that slight or trivial similarities are not substantial and are
therefore non-infringing. But it is equally clear that two works may
not be literally identical and yet, for purposes of copyright infringe-
ment, may be found to be substantially similar. The problem, then, is
one of line drawing. "Somewhere between the one extreme of no simi-
larity and the other of complete and literal similarity lies the line
marking off the boundaries of 'substantial similarity.' 13
To further complicate the issue, the substantial similarity inquiry
must take into account that copyright law precludes appropriation of
only those elements of a work that are protected by copyright.' 4 Copy-
9. Obtaining federal patent protection requires a detailed substantive examination of an appli-
cant's claim in which the invention must be proven to be novel, useful, and non-obvious. See 35
U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (application requirements); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (specification of claims); 35
U.S.C § 113 (1988) (drawings); 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1988) (models and specimens); 35 U.S.C. § 115
(1988) (oath); 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-133 (1988) (examination process).
Obtaining federal trademark protection also requires a substantive examination process, where
the distinctiveness of the mark, its potential conflict with existing marks, and its "genericness" are
considered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988) (application); 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1988) (examination); 15
U.S.C. § 1063 (1988) (opposition proceedings); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067-1071 (1988) (appeals to Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board and federal courts).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (author's exclusive rights in copyrighted works).
11. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
12. Michael Ferdinand Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions" The Proper RoleforAudi-
ence Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 385 (1981). See also 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1992) [hereinafter
NIMMER]; Robert Fuller Fleming, Substantial Similarity; Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 CoPY-
RIGHT L. SYMp. (ASCAP) 252, 262 (1971) ("This nebulous area of similarity is the heart of copy-
right law, and no doubt it is the most evasive part."); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 722-23
(1987) ("It is a phrase that, instead of becoming more understood with each judicial interpretation,
has become more ambiguous.").
13. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[A], at 13-28 (citations omitted).
14. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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right does not protect ideas, 15 systems, methods or processes,16 facts,' 7
titles,'8 words, short phrases or idioms,' 9 plots (if general),20 themes,
21
scenes-a-faire,22 or literary characters (unless the character has been suffi-
ciently developed). 23  Therefore, discounting "uncopyrightable" or
"nonprotectable" material from the substantial similarity calculus may
make sense.
The Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,24 recently defined the essential element of an infringement
claim as "copying of constituent elements of [a] work that are origi-
nal."'25 This language emphasizes the purpose of the copyright statutes-
to protect original works of authorship. At issue in Feist were the white
pages of a telephone directory. The Court found defendant's conduct
noninfringing as a matter of law, given that the material taken by defend-
ant was not original. Thus, Feist clearly stands for the proposition that
literal copying is not actionable when the copying is limited to unoriginal
expression.26 But what should be done when a defendant appropriates
material that is both original (therefore protectable) and unoriginal
(therefore nonprotectable)? Should the works be examined in their en-
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (protection does not extend to ideas).
16. Id. See also, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (case involving.a manual describing a
new system of bookkeeping).
17. See, eg., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (news of the
war in Europe); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (biographi-
cal information).
18. See, eg., Weissman v. Radio Corp. of Am., 80 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Cox, 39 F. Supp. 487 (W.D.S.C. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942);
Brondfield v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 107 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
19. See, e.g., Morris v. Wilson, 189 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), afftd, 295 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1004 (1962).
20. See, eg., Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967).
See also NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[B], at 13-59 n.148.
21. See, eg., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 980 (1976).
22. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
23. See e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945,
950 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955) (This case involved the sale of the story "The
Maltese Falcon." "'The characters were vehicles for the story told .. . " and were found not to be
copyrightable.); Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 39 F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D.S.C. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942) ("Neither is the plaintiff entitled under its copyright to a
monopoly of a mere character as such.").
But see Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983)
(character clearly identified by thoughts, words, feelings, and action is sufficiently well-developed to
be copyrighted); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (Mickey and Minnie Mouse cartoon characters sufficiently developed to war-
rant copyright protection).
24. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
25. Id. at 1295.
26. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[B], at 13-64.
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tirety to determine the extent of substantial similarity? Or should the
nonprotectable elements somehow be "dissected out" or excised from the
whole, leaving only the works' protectable elements to be examined? A
perusal of infringement cases indicates that the courts have used both
approaches; the differences seemingly due to the nature of the work being
examined.
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the two methods of ap-
proaching substantial similarity when a defendant has copied both pro-
tectable and nonprotectable elements of a plaintiff's work. Part II of this
Note presents a general overview of the substantial similarity test. The
test has been applied in two ways, both utilizing a two-step application.27
Part III of this Note examines cases that approach substantial simi-
larity with the view that a work should be examined in its entirety,28 then
follows with an examination of cases that take the opposite approach by
excising nonprotectable elements from the whole. 29 Part IV examines
whether patterns appear in the approach based on the particular nature
of the work involved (e.g., musical works, literary works) and whether it
is sensible to treat different types of works differently. 30 Part IV also
examines whether general principles exist that might be applied in ap-
proaching particular types of works.31 This Note concludes with a brief
examination of a possible interpretation of Feist, as suggested by Profes-
sor Nimmer,32 detailing how that interpretation would dictate the ap-
proach to substantial similarity regardless of the type of work involved. 33
II. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN GENERAL
Substantial similarity is the final inquiry of the three-prong test for
infringement, as discussed in Part 1.34 The substantial similarity issue
has been broken down into two queries: First, was there copying? Sec-
ond, was there misappropriation (defendant appropriated protected ele-
ments from plaintiff's work)?35 Copying can be proven by access and
27. See infra text accompanying notes 34-47.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 50-69.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 89-162.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 163-66.
32. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[E][1][b], at 13-78.1 to 13-78.4(1).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 167-69.
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The phrase "substantial similarity" is sometimes
used to refer to both the evaluation of whether there has been copying and whether defendant has
taken enough of the work to constitute infringement, and sometimes only to the second evaluation.
This Note uses the phrase in the first context.
35. Case authority for this notion dates back at least to Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552), and was made explicit by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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similarity, although "if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence
of access will suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of fact must determine whether the simi-
larities are sufficient to prove copying."' 36 Under the guidelines estab-
lished by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter, copying may be proven
by expert testimony and analysis.37 Courts have suggested that the
works at issue should be compared in their entirety, including both pro-
tectable and nonprotectable elements.38 The comparison should reveal
whether defendant independently created the work.
The second question, that of misappropriation, however, is to be de-
termined by "the response of the ordinary lay [person], ' 39 and has been
termed the "audience test." 4 The Arnstein court held that no expert tes-
timony, detailed analysis, or careful dissection is proper in the audience
test.4 ' Instead, misappropriation-"an issue of fact which a jury is pecu-
liarly fitted to determine"42-should be determined by an ordinary ob-
server's impression of the entire work. Thus, while the test for copying is
to be made by expert dissection and analysis, the misappropriation test is
to be applied by an ordinary observer based on his or her overall impres-
sion of the work.
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc v. McDonald's
Corp.,43 the Ninth Circuit-for reasons not germane to this Note-ar-
ticulated a test that was different from Arnstein.44 The Krofft court re-
ferred to the copying question as the "extrinsic test" and the
misappropriation question as the "intrinsic test."' 45 As in Arnstein, the
copying question (extrinsic test) is to be resolved by experts, and analytic
dissection is appropriate. 46 The misappropriation question (intrinsic test)
is to be resolved by the trier of fact, responding as would an ordinary
36. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
37. Id.
38. See Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Weitzenkom v. Lesser 256 P.2d 947
(Cal. 1953) (en banc). But see Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 221 P.2d 95 (Cal. 1950) (en banc).
39. Arnste'm v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Ci. 1946).
40. Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating
that "audience" and "lay observer" tests are equivalent); see also Arnstein v. Broadcast Music, 46 F.
Supp. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (using test), aff'd, 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943).
41. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
42. Id.
43. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. For a comparison of these cases see Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copy.
ing: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187, 1202-03
(1990).
45. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163-65
(9th Cir. 1977). But see Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (reinterpreting the Krofft
test); and infra note 152.




This Note focuses on the second test-referred to as "misappropria-
tion" in Arnstein or "the intrinsic test" in Kroffi. Interestingly, whether
one is inclined to take a "dissection" approach or a "totality" approach
to the question of misappropriation, both expert analysis and dissection
are appropriate to determine copying under Arnstein and Krofft. Under
either approach, the trier of fact will decide both issues and, therefore,
may be exposed to expert analysis and dissection in the determination of
copying. The trier of fact then will be instructed to strike this informa-
tion from memory when determining misappropriation. Thus, the court
and the jury must keep track of the exact issue being decided. For exam-
ple, the court in UniversalAthletic Sales v. Salkeld48 could infer only that
the district court had addressed the copying issue but not the misappro-
priation issue, because the district court seemed to be dissecting rather
than using the ordinary observer test.
49
III. PROTECTION OF WORKS WHERE DEFENDANT HAS TAKEN
PROTECTABLE AND NONPROTECTABLE ELEMENTS
That two works can have protectable and nonprotectable elements
of similarity is beyond dispute. How courts should consider those ele-
ments is not yet settled. Should the entire work, including nonprotect-
able elements, be considered as a whole in determining misappropriation?
Or, alternatively, should nonprotectable elements be excised before com-
paring the works?
A. The "Total Concept and Feel" Approach
The phrase "total concept and feel" was coined in a 1970 Ninth
Circuit opinions° and resurfaced in a 1976 Second Circuit case involving
a children's story.51 One year later, the phrase became an important
touchstone in copyright law when the Ninth Circuit used it to describe
the similarities between plaintiffs' and defendant's works in Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 5 2
In Krofft, plaintiffs claimed that defendant's advertising campaign
47. Id.
48. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
49. Id. at 907.
50. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). See gener-
ally NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[A][I][c], at 13-37 to 13-41.
51. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976).
52. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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infringed their copyright in "H.R. Pufnstuf," a Saturday morning televi-
sion show involving fantasy characters living in an imaginary land.53 Ac-
cess was not at issue in Krofft, as defendant had been negotiating with
plaintiffs for a license to use the Pufnstuf characters in an advertising
campaign. 54 The court developed the bifurcated test discussed previ-
ously5 5 and, in regard to the intrinsic test, stated: "It is clear to us that
defendants' works are substantially similar to plaintiffs'. They have cap-
tured the 'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf show."' 56 In discussing
"total concept and feel," the Krofft court disapproved of defendant's
penchant for pointing out minor differences between the works-such as
defendant's mayor wearing a diplomatic sash as opposed to plaintiff's
mayor wearing a cummerbund."
Not surprisingly, the courts have perpetuated the total concept and
feel approach to misappropriation. As one commentator has stated:
The appeal of the "totality" infringements approach is evident. The
task of the fact-finder is simplified because it can examine the work in
its entirety, and decide, without much analysis, whether a subsequent
author took "the heart" of the original work. There is no need for a
careful, refined separation of fact and expression. Moreover, a "total-
ity" approach allows a fact-finder to respond to a visceral feeling that
something unfair was done.58
In fact, it seems that such an approach is required under the Arnstein and
Kroffl audience test where "dissection" is used only when determining
copying. But, if defendant is found to have taken both copyrightable and
noncopyrightable elements, considering nonprotectable elements in the
test for misappropriation may be problematic. After all, elements not
protectable under copyright law cannot be misappropriated.
An analogy might be made between taking the total concept and feel
approach to works comprised of both protectable and nonprotectable ele-
ments and the approach to misappropriation used with compilations.
The individual facts that compose a compilation are not copyrightable in
themselves. However, a compilation of facts is copyrightable if the selec-
tion and arrangement of the facts is sufficiently original.5 9 Applying this
rationale to other works, it follows that although individual elements
53. Id. at 1162.
54. Id. at 1161.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
56. Id. at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970)).
57. Id.
58. Elliott M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions Paradoxe
and Inconsistencies, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 133, 147 (1988).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
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may not be copyrightable, the composite work would be protectable if
the elements were assembled in a creative or original way.
The Seventh Circuit appeared to adopt this approach in the 1989
case Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co. 60 In Roulo, plaintiff claimed infringe-
ment of her copyright in a greeting card line.61 The cream-colored, sin-
gle-faced greeting cards were inscribed with sentimental messages. As in
Krojft, copying was not at issue because defendant had distributed plain-
tiff's cards under a two-year contract prior to the alleged infringing ac-
tion. Plaintiff did not renew the contract, whereupon defendant began to
manufacture cards comparable to plaintiff's. 62 The Roulo court relied on
its previous decision in Atari, Inc, v. North American Philips Consumer
Electronics Corp.,63 holding that "dissection of the subject matter into
copyrighted and unprotected elements is generally rejected in favor of
examining the 'total concept and feel' of the copyrighted work."
64
In Roulo, defendant argued that the district court erred in allowing
the jury to consider elements of similarity unprotected by copyright law,
such as the size and color of the cards, the color of the ink and border
design, the frequent use of ellipses in the messages, and the single-side
format. The Seventh Circuit responded, "While it is true that these ele-
ments are not individually capable of protection.., it is the unique com-
bination of these common elements which form the copyrighted
material.",65 The court further stated, "[Roulo's] copyright is in the ar-
tistic combination of all the common elements in the... design. '" 6
6
Thus, the total concept and feel rubric has gained at least limited
acceptance as an approach to the misappropriation test of substantial
similarity, having been looked upon with favor and applied by courts
such as the Seventh Circuit in Roulo. As pointed out by Professor Nim-
mer,67 however, "concepts" are statutorily ineligible for copyright pro-
tection 68 and the addition of "feel" to the approach does little to clarify
the already convoluted issue of substantial similarity.
69
60. 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990).
61. Id. at 934.
62. Id.
63. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). In Atari, the audiovisual display
of defendant's K.C. Munchkin game substantially appropriated plaintiff's PAC-MAN computer
game. Id. at 618.
64. Roulo, 886 F.2d at 939.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 940.
67. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[A][1][c], at 13-40.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
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B. The Dissection Approach
In contrast to the total concept and feel approach to the misappro-
priation inquiry under substantial similarity, only one case appears to
have clearly articulated its adoption of the dissection approach.
70
Courts have applied this approach in many cases,71 however, no doubt
due in part to their awareness that some elements are ineligible for copy-
right protection. Confusion in the courts has also been common as to
which test of substantial similarity (copying or misappropriation, extrin-
sic or intrinsic) to deal with, leading to the use of information obtained
upon expert or detailed analysis on the first issue when considering the
second issue. As discussed previously, this use is incorrect under both
Arnstein and Krofft.7 2 Finally, even if misappropriation is clearly at is-
sue, the ordinary observer-when considering appropriation-probably
is unable to disregard the analysis and expert testimony proper under the
proof of copying test.
7 3
Understanding the meaning of "dissection" is essential when consid-
ering the dissection approach. Certainly, dissection cannot mean break-
ing down works into their smallest parts, such as words in a book or
notes in a song. Those elements are clearly not copyrightable and excis-
ing those elements would leave nothing to protect. But if one doesn't
look to the smallest element, where should one look? To a sentence, a
paragraph, a chapter of a literary work? To one, two, three or more bars
of a musical work? Such uncertainty makes the substantial similarity
determination all the more difficult. Yet, as discussed below in this Note,
courts do appear to utilize different levels of dissection, and the level used
depends on the nature of the work.74
In Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 75 plain-
tiff alleged copyright infringement of seven concrete lawn ornaments. 76
Some of the designs were based on variously posed realistic figures of
animals, such as swans or deer.77 The court recognized, that the idea of
naturalistic depictions of animals is ineligible for copyright protection,
70. See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 608-09 (lst Cir. 1988)
and infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
71. See e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983); Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982); Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel,
Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Farmers Indep. Tel. Co. v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457
(W.D. Wis. 1986).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
74. See infra part IV. D.
75. 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).




and that plaintiff could only prohibit actual copying of its own version of
realistic-looking concrete animals.78 However, the court cautioned that
proof of copying may be difficult because, for example, "[one] statue is a
detailed replica of a real deer, [therefore] the deer, in essence, supplied
most of the features ... [and] any subsequent artist can also take from
the real deer."'7
9
The court in Concrete Machinery went on to instruct the lower court
that, on rehearing, the lower court should identify and "dissect" the pro-
tected elements from the unprotected elements to prove copying. Then,
by focussing on the aspects that are protected, the court was to determine
"whether [plaintiff] is likely to prove, under the ordinary observer test,
that [defendant's] works are substantially similar to its own."80 This lan-
guage clearly implicates a dissection approach.
The court in Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator81
also appeared to use a dissection approach. The case involved infringe-
ment of an illustrated radiator catalog.82 Plaintiff alleged that an ordi-
nary observer would find the catalogs virtually indistinguishable.8 3 The
court responded by observing, "[plaintiff] misses the point. What is im-
portant is not whether there is substantial similarity in the total concept
and feel of the works.., but whether the very small amount of protect-
able expression in [plaintiff's] catalog is substantially similar to the
equivalent portions of [defendant's] catalog."'8 4 The court clearly re-
jected the total concept and feel approach, focusing only on the similarity
between protectable elements that had been extracted from the whole.
Unfortunately, the court never explained how an ordinary observer, who
is not to analyze or dissect a work under the test for misappropriation,
could focus only on protectable elements.
One possible explanation of the Cooling Systems court's dissection
approach to misappropriation could be that the work at issue was a cata-
log-a work containing "facts, numbers, and literal depictions of con-
crete objects."85 In reference to that type of work, the court made an
interesting observation: "[C]opyright law considers factual works to be
fundamentally different from more artistic works: 'similarity of expres-
sion may have to amount to verbatim reproduction or very close para-
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 611.
81. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 493.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 491.
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phrasing before a factual work will be deemed infringed.' "8 6 The court
emphasized that, in the case of a factual work, the range of possible ex-
pressions is narrow.
87
The factual work distinction articulated by the court in Cooling Sys-
tems also could explain the result in Concrete Machinery. The statue of a
deer is arguably a visual factual work. Therefore, where it may "make
sense to refer to the 'total concept and feel' of a greeting card... or
anthropomorphic fantasy world,"88 the dissection approach may be more
suitable to evaluate other types of works.
IV. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF WoRKS
This Note theorizes that varying the choice of approach with the
type of work at issue may be sensible. The following sections analyze the
application of this theory to visual works, musical works, and literary
works, and examine whether any general statements about application of
the two approaches are possible.
A. Visual Works
This Note discusses above two examples of visual works: the fantasy
creatures in Krofft and the lawn ornaments in Concrete Machinery.8 9
These cases are illustrative of the totality approach and the dissection
approach, respectively, under the intrinsic test of substantial similarity.
A perusal of cases addressing the issue of substantial similarity suggests
that inconsistency in approach is common when dealing with nonverbal
or visual works.
Although courts use both approaches, the total concept and feel ap-
proach seems more common. 90 There are two possible reasons. First,
86. Id. (quoting Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)).
87. Id. Cf. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). This
case involved plaintiff charging infringement of a gold and jeweled bee pin. The court in this case
held no infringement stating, "The difficulty, as we have noted, is that on this record the 'idea' and
its 'expression' appear to be indistinguishable. There is no greater similarity between the pins of the
plaintiff and defendants than is inevitable from the use of jewel-encrusted bee forms in both." Id. at
742.
88. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[A][l][c], at 13-39.
89. See supra notes 52-57, 75-80 and accompanying text.
90. For a sampling of nonverbal/visual cases which utilized a total concept and feel approach,
see, eg., Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff claimed McDonald's
"Mac Tonite" character in its ad campaign infringed his copyrighted mask depicting the man in the
moon); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff alleged infringement of
her "Feeling Sensitive" greeting cards), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); McClloch v. Albert E.
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs alleged infringement of a decorative red plate
bearing the message "You Are Special Today"); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec.
Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff claimed infringement of its PAC-MAN game by defendant's
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this approach was adopted by the court in Kroffl, a case that has been
quoted extensively and is binding authority in the Ninth Circuit-a cir-
cuit that hears a large proportion of copyright cases. 91 Second, although
the concept is not new that elements in the public domain may be copied
without liability,92 the 1988 decision in Concrete Machinery appears to be
the first to articulate coherently a dissection approach when considering
visual subject matter.93 Earlier courts, even after the 1977 Krofft deci-
sion, have used the dissection approach without saying so explicitly.94
Surprisingly, one of these cases, Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co.,9 5 was decided
by the Ninth Circuit, the court that decided Krofft.
Aliotti involved a complaint alleging infringement in the design of
stuffed dinosaurs. 96 Plaintiff had been under contract to create stuffed
dinosaurs for a company that went bankrupt. Plaintiff subsequently ne-
gotiated with defendant for defendant to take over the marketing of
plaintiff's copyrighted designs, including the stuffed dinosaurs. 97 De-
fendant did not do so, and instead began developing its own line of
stuffed toy dinosaurs. Defendant ultimately offered for sale stuffed dino-
saurs of the same six species as those plaintiff had presented. 98 Although
defendant offered evidence of independent creation, the court assumed
defendant had appropriated plaintiff's idea.
K.C. Munchkin game), cert denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir. 1966) (alleged infringement of "Tammy" and "Pepper" fashion dolls); Recycled Paper
Prods., Inc. v. Pat Fashions Indus., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 624 ($.D.N.Y. 1990) (infringement of "Theo-
dore Bear" teddy bear); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp.
1165 (D. Mass. 1989) (infringements of decorative banners); Cory Van Rijn, Inc. v. California Raisin
Advisory Bd., 697 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (plaintiff claimed infringement of its humanized
"Raisin People" by defendant's "Claymatic Raisin"); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff sued producers, promoters and advisers of the movie
"Moscow on the Hudson," alleging that the movie's promotional poster infringed his copyright on
an illustration he created for The New Yorker magazine); Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Holland
Fabrics, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (infringement of plaintiff's floral fabric design);
Lauratex Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (infringement of
plaintiff's distinctive floral design).
See also Mistretta v. Curole, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1707 (E.D. La. 1992). In Mistretta the court
expressly rejected an approach which would excise the uncopyrightable elements before examining
the works for similarities. Instead the court noted that the work as a whole, not each element, was
protected by copyright. Id. at 1708-09.
91. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1166-67
(9th Cir. 1977).
92. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
93. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
94. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway
Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d
Cir. 1982); Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
95. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 899.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 900.
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In its decision, the court first cited Krofft for the proposition that
dissection is not appropriate under the intrinsic test, and that dissection
of dissimilarities is inappropriate because it distracts an ordinary ob-
server from the total concept and feel of the work.99 However, the court
went on to state:
To the extent that it is necessary to determine whether similarities re-
sult from nonprotectable expression, it is appropriate under Krofft's
intrinsic test to perform analytic dissection of similarities. Although
even nonprotectable material should be considered when determining
if there is substantial similarity of expression, no substantial similarity
may be found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demon-
strates that all similarities in expression arise from the use of common
ideas.100
By this language the court certainly appeared to mean merely that a de-
fendant will not be held liable to a plaintiff if only unprotected elements
of a work are taken. The language used in the opinion is confusing, how-
ever, because it is difficult to see a meaningful distinction between "dis-
section of dissimilarities" (which the court holds as inappropriate under
the intrinsic or misappropriate test) and "dissection of similarities"
(which, the court states, is appropriate under the intrinsic test). Unfortu-
nately, in at least one case a court already has utilized a dissection test
based on this confusing language in Aliotti.101
When determining infringement of more creative abstract visual
works, such as a fabric design or fantasy-land character, the total concept
and feel approach makes sense. In these cases, far more ways of expres-
sing ideas exist, and holding a defendant liable for the similarity of over-
all impression of these works would be logical.102 For example, while not
much latitude exists for the design of a realistic-looking concrete deer,
the same cannot be said of a fabric design with an oriental motif. In
addition, allowing any one person copyright in the total concept and feel
of "visual" facts, such as natural depictions, arguably would take too
much away from other authors or artists. Granting copyright in a natu-
99. Id. at 901.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Trust Co. Bank v. Putnam Publishing Group Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1874 (C.D. Cal.
1988). For a discussion of this case, see also infra text accompanying notes 157-60.
102. The dichotomy between idea and expression is an important issue in copyright cases. This
principle is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (no protection for "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery").
The court in Kroffi stated, "(Tihe scope of copyright protection increases with the extent ex-
pression differs from the idea." Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
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ralistic depiction of a deer would, in a sense, give the artist a monopoly in
a work created by nature, not the artist.
B. Musical Works
As demonstrated in the previous section, visual works, particularly
works not based on visual "fact," are suited to a totalities approach to
misappropriation. However, musical works, for reasons outlined in this
section, do not appear suited to a totalities approach, but dissection taken
to the extreme would not make sense because individual notes are not
copyrightable. Yet, a landmark case of musical infringement, Arnstein v.
Porter,10 3 required misappropriation to be determined by "the response
of the ordinary lay hearer," 1°4 in essence utilizing a totalities test. One
commentator has offered a possible explanation for this approach:
Musical works, and nonverbal works generally, are less amenable to
verbal description than verbal works and, therefore, a "totalities" ap-
proach seems more suitable for these creations. Moreover... "dissec-
tion" analysis of music to determine infringement could be misleading.
Alterations, which might sound impressive when described verbally in
technical jargon, may not greatly affect how the work reaches the
ear. 1
0 5
Thus, even if the extrinsic test appears to indicate that a number of simi-
larities exist between two works, the works may not sound alike. If the
works don't sound alike, holding a defendant liable for infringement
would seem unwise. As Judge Clark opined in his dissent in Arnstein,
"[O]ne may look to the total impression to repulse the charge of plagia-
rism where minute 'dissection' might dredge up some points of similarity
.... [O]ne cannot use a purely theoretical disquisition to supply a tonal
resemblance which does not otherwise exist."' 10 6
However, one commentator, Raphael Metzger, believes that a totali-
ties approach to the audience test to music is inadequate. 10 7 Music, in
Metzger's mind, does not clearly communicate ideas, as literature and
speech do. As he has commented, "Music does not communicate ideas,
but engenders impressions among its listeners. Whereas speech and liter-
ature communicate ideas which engage the human intellect, music con-
veys general impressions .*...,"108 Thus, "[b]ecause similarity of idea
cannot be considered in musical infringement cases, there is less informa-
103. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
104. Id. at 468.
105. Abramson, supra note 58, at 148.
106. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946).
107. See Raphael Metzger, Name That Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical Plagia-
rism, 5 Loy. Er. L. J. 61 (1985).
108. Id. at 68.
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tion available in musical than [in] literary plagiarism cases upon which a
determination of infringement may be based." 1 9 Metzger has further
theorized that the aural sense of the ordinary person is undeveloped,
making it difficult for most people to knowledgeably compare two musi-
cal compositions.'10 Additionally, visual comparison of musical scores
would probably not suffice because only experts can "hear" a composi-
tion by reading the score. 111 Therefore, as an alternative approach to the
determination of misappropriation, Metzger has proposed use of the La
Rue test, 1 2 which essentially requires dissection of the work-not by in-
dividual notes but by composition elements of sound, harmony, melody
and rhythm.11 3 Unlike the audience test for other works, in musical
works experts would present analytical comparisons and assist the trier
of fact in aurally ascertaining whether the works are similar.11 4 The tes-
timony presumably would include information as to the prevalence of the
composition elements at issue in the public domain. For example, a de-
fendant would not be liable for using a rhythm pattern substantially simi-
lar to a plaintiff's if that rhythm pattern is used extensively in musical
works. This approach may alleviate the problems inherent in the lay
hearer test: untrained ears searching for similarities in probably the least
tangible of all the arts.
Some cases seem to delineate the amount of actionable similarity. 1 5
For example, similarity in accompaniment, even if no similarity exists in
the melody, is enough to constitute infringement." 6 Similarity in a musi-
cal "motif" may constitute an infringement,117 and "similarity may arise
out of the grouping of notes, similarity of bars, accent, harmony, or mel-




112. Metzger, supra note 107, at 96-107. Metzger applyies a test based on the work of Professor
La Rue in JAN LA RUE, GUIDELINES FOR STYLE ANALYSIS (1971). Professor La Rue's work rec-
ognizes four elements of music: sound, harmony, melody and rhythm. These elements interact pro-
ducing a fifth element, growth. Professor La Rue also examines the components in relation to each
other. LA RUE, supra, at 3.
113. LA RuE, supra note 112, at 3.
114. Metzger, supra note 107, at 99.
115. There is no foundation to the superstition that the copying of three bars or less from a
musical composition does not constitute an infringement. See eg., Robertson v. Batten, Barton,
Durstine, & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (copying of two bars held to be an
infringement).
116. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (D.C.N.Y. 1924). This case involved composer
Jerome Kern as the defendant. The rolling underphrase of the accompaniment was found to infringe
plaintiff's composition. Id.
117. Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
118. Id. at 201. See also Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d
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lized a dissection approach much like the La Rue test (though far less
technical).
C. Literary Works
Verbal works differ from visual and musical works in that "similari-
ties [in verbal works] can be described in the medium in which they oc-
cur, that is, language."' 1 9 An approach such as "total concept and feel"
seems less meaningful when precise verbal descriptions of similarity are
possible. Yet a dissection approach to a literary work presents the same
problem as that approach applied to a musical work: if single words are
not copyrightable, at what level do.groups of words become copyright-
able? Once again, extraction of nonprotectable words from an entire lit-
erary work leaves nothing to be protected from infringement. Copyright
law was not designed for this result. "It is as though... Shakespeare
[were to be found] a plagiarist on the basis of his use of articles, pro-
nouns, prepositions and adjectives also used by others."'120 For literary
works, then, it may make sense to examine the same sort of dissection
approach that has been applied to musical works.121
1. Works of Nonfiction
Nonfiction literature runs the gamut from telephone directories
22 to
racing forms123 to datebook organizers124 to historical accounts.125
These works contain information not protectable under copyright, either
because the work is of a factual nature like telephone directories and
historical accounts or because the work falls prey to the merger of idea
and expression. 26 Due to those limitations, dissection of the nonprotect-
able components of these works is necessary to see whether any remain-
Cir. 1983) (action claiming George Harrison's composition "My Sweet Lord" infringed the song
"He's So Fine," written by Ronald Mack and recorded by the Chiffons).
119. Abramson, supra note 58, at 148.
120. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 477 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 103-18.
122. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); Farmers Indep.
Tel. Co. v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide
Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
123. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Mass 1942).
124. Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989).
125. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980).
126. This phenomenon, called the "merger doctrine," applies when the unprotectable ideas in a
work are inseparable from the work's expression. In such a case, copyright may not prohibit the use
of the expression necessary to convey the idea. See generally NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.0311]3],
at 13-65 to 13-69. See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (case involving a method and special
forms for accounting).
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ing elements of the work are worthy of protection. As discussed
previously,1 27 in a compilation none of the individual facts contained in
the work are protectable. Therefore, a true dissection-elimination of all
noncopyrightable elements from the test-would leave little, if any, pro-
tectable matter. Yet compilations are protectable because of the original-
ity in the overall selection and arrangement of facts. 128
Despite the confusion in determining substantial similarity of other
types of works, courts generally approach non-fiction literature quite log-
ically. Courts recognize that certain elements of these works are not en-
titled to protection and discount these elements from the substantial
similarity calculus. Although there has been confusion in the past over
the "sweat of the brow" approach to protecting compilations and factual
works,12 9 the Supreme Court decision in Feist 30 put that issue to rest,
allowing no protection beyond that allowed by the copyright statute re-
gardless of the amount of labor expended in'research.131 The Feist Court
stressed further the importance of the selection, coordination, and ar-
rangement of data, as opposed to the copyrightability of individual facts.
In this way, Feist supports a dissection approach similar to that proposed
for "factual" visual works.1 3
2
The Feist decision is sensible. As with factual visual works, the
number of possible ways to express an idea is limited in nonfiction works,
whether considering the white pages of a phone book or an historical
account of Lincoln's assassination. A useful example might be commis-
sioning ten people to independently compile telephone directories. How
different could the resulting works be? In contrast, a request to write a
fictional "boy meets girl" story undoubtedly would produce ten very dif-
ferent works. The latitude of expression is far greater for the fictional
work because the authors need not work within a confined set of facts.
Therefore, granting copyright to one author for anything but the selec-
tion and arrangement of facts in a nonfiction work arguably would take
too much away from other authors. Granting copyright in such a situa-
tion, regardless of the brow sweat expended, would be akin to granting a
127. See supra text accompanying note 59.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
129. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Eisenschiml v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Leon v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper
Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942). See generally Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in
Collections of Facts" A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 CoLUM. L. REv.
516 (1981).
130. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
131. Id. at 1291.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
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seventy-five year monopoly on facts, and "would severely limit the ability
of later authors to build upon their predecessors' contributions."
133
2. Works of Fiction
Conceptually, few would argue that courts should approach fictional
works in the same manner as nonfiction works to determine substantial
similarity. Clearly with fictional works, defendants are liable when com-
plete literal similarity is found. That makes sense under both ap-
proaches, because the word-for-word dissection would be the same and
the total concept and feel of the works and their expression also would be
the same.
A total concept and feel approach to literature presents problems,
however, because the plot (depending on how generally it is described)
134
or gist of an entire work is no doubt in the public domain.1 35 For the
same reason that facts are not copyrightable, neither are plots. For ex-
ample, to allow one author to have a monopoly on "boy meets girl, boy
loses girl, boy gets girl back," would take too much away from other
authors. Yet the total concept and feel of a literary work is probably best
described by a recitation of the plot.
Additionally, a total concept and feel approach does not adequately
address the issue of partial literal similarity.1 36 For instance, a defendant
is liable for closely paraphrasing a work 37 or for taking even a quantita-
tively small literal portion of a work if the similar material is qualitatively
important.1 38 Yet in the latter case, the copying may not be enough to
make similar the total concept and feel of the works. Though courts do
not usually find infringement on the basis of similarity of a single sen-
tence, Judge Jerome Frank once stated that, though quantitatively small,
133. Denicola, supra note 129, at 525.
134. See, eg., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Co., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (lengthy com-
parison between the plots of defendant's movie and plaintiff's play).
135. For a discussion of the concept of the public domain as it pertains to copyright, see Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965 (1990).
136. See generally NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[A][2], at 13-46 to 13-52.1.
137. See Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.) ("in copy-
right law paraphrasing is equivalent to outright copying"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970). See
also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Mere-
dith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d
Cir. 1974).
138. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (300 words out of
200,000 considered substantial, especially as the heart of the work had been taken); Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 463 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 621
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) (two-and-a-half minutes of a 28 minute film segment found to infringe);
Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (quantitatively even 0.8% of the work copied
might be found to infringe); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (three sentences considered substantial).
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the copying of the lines "Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare," or
"Twas brillig and the slithy toves," could constitute an infringement.1 39
One can imagine, however, that the aforementioned infringing sentences
could be included in a work without changing its total concept and feel.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 140 the Second Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of substantial similarity. Nichols concerned the alleged
infringement of plaintiff's play "Abie's Irish Rose" by defendant's mo-
tion picture "The Cohens and the Kellys." Both works involved a quar-
rel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their children,
the birth of grandchildren, and a reconciliation. 141 At trial, an expert
witness attempted to show infringement by use of a complicated alge-
braic formula. 142 The lower court judge rejected any dissection of the
works. 143 But on appeal, Judge Learned Hand suggested a sort of dissec-
tion approach:
Upon any work and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times consist of
only its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could pre-
vent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his
property is never extended.144
Hand's abstractions test helpfully expresses the real difficulty in deter-
mining whether a work is worthy of copyright protection: finding the
level of the work appropriate for dissection and comparison.
Other courts have basically used Hand's formulation in Nichols,
comparing plot, sequence of events, etc., in combination with an evalua-
tion of the total concept and feel of the work. Courts have utilized the
abstractions test also to determine copying under the extrinsic test, using
the total concept and feel approach to determine misappropriation. 145
For example, in Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop,146 the court
found that both plaintiff's and defendant's work presented an identical
sequence of events, but that the sequence was in the public domain.147
139. Heim v. Universal Pictures Corp., 154 F.2d 480, 487 n.8 (2d Cir. 1946).
140. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cerL denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
141. Id.
142. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 45 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
143. Id. at 147-48.
144. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
145. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.) (infringement of plaintiff's work
"reincarnation" by novel and movie "Coma"), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
146. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
147. IdL at 89.
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The court went on to examine the "total concept and feel" 148 of the
works, but in doing so actually dissected the story, comparing specific
components such as characters, locale, choice of illustrations, and
dialogue. 
49
The case of Litchfield v. Spielberg1 50 involved a plaintiff claiming
that Steven Spielberg's blockbuster movie "E.T." infringed her musical
play "Lokey from Maldemar." The court in Litchfield proceeded the
same way as did the Reyher court, examining the sequence of events,
mood, and dialogue to determine copying and citing Kroffl's total con-
cept and feel approach to determine misappropriation. Yet here, the
court stated that the difference in overall themes of the works showed
that the total concept and feel was not the same.151 Though both courts
refer to their approach to misappropriation as total concept and feel, the
Reyher court actually was utilizing a dissection approach. 152
148. Id. at 91-92 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th
Cir. 1970)).
149. Id. at 92-93. In this case, the court held that there was no infringement by the defendant.
150. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
151. Id. at 1357 ("Whereas E_ T concentrates on the development of the characters and the
relationship between a boy and an extra-terrestrial, Lokey uses the caricatures to develop its theme of
mankind divided by fear and hate.").
152. In Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit has recently reinter-
preted infringement analysis under Krofft, at least as the analysis should be applied to literary works.
Krofft defined the extrinsic test as a measure for the similarity of ideas, and the intrinsic test as a
measure of the similarity of expression. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. The court in Shaw, however, saw
both tests as analyses of expression: the extrinsic test to be determined by objective criteria; the
intrinsic test to be determined subjectively by the trier of fact. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356-57.
The district court in Shaw had held previously that there was no substantial similarity between
two works, both involving television series called The Equalizer, and had granted summary judg-
ment to the defendants. The summary judgment was reversed on appeal.
The circuit court reasoned that, whereas Krofft listed three or four discrete criteria for consider-
ation under the extrinsic test of substantial similarity, recent cases listed "plot, themes, dialogue,
mood, setting, pace, and sequence" as extrinsic test criteria. IM (quoting Jason v. Fonda, 526 F.
Supp. 774, 777 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd and incorporated by reference, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The court continued:
Now that [the extrinsic test] includes virtually every element that may be considered con-
crete in a literary work, the extrinsic test as applied to books, scripts, plays, and motion
pictures can no longer be seen as a test for mere similarity of ideas. Because the criteria
incorporated into the extrinsic test encompass all objective manifestations of creativity, the
two tests are more sensibly described as objective and subjective analyses of expression,
having strayed from Kroff's division between expression and ideas. Indeed, a judicial de-
termination under the intrinsic test is now virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test
has become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not
similar.
Id. at 1357 (citations omitted). As far as the summary judgment was concerned, the court held that
because objective elements such as plot, mood, etc. are embodied in the extrinsic test, it is improper
for a court to find that there is no substantial similarity as a matter of law "based only on a subjective
assessment of 'concept and feel' of two works of literature-a task no more suitable for a judge than
for a jury," when similarity was found under the extrinsic test. Id. at 1360.
The Ninth Circuit extended the Shaw holding to a case involving a computer program in Brown
Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
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Two Ninth Circuit cases have cited Aliotti as authority for applying
the dissection approach to fictional works. In Olson v. National Broad-
casting Co. 153 plaintiff claimed NBC's television series "The A-Team"
infringed his copyright to a screenplay. The court first compared plot,
theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, and sequence of events under the
extrinsic test,15 4 and determined that no substantial similarity existed be-
tween the works. The court went on to state that no substantial similar-
ity existed under the intrinsic test either because, while a "reasonable
jury might have found substantial similarity in the total concept and feel
of the works[,] ... no substantial similarity may be found under the
intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities
in expression arise from the use of common ideas."
155
Olson was like Aliotti in that defendant didn't take anything copy-
rightable from plaintiff's work. Therefore, the court did not need to re-
solve the issue of misappropriation. But the court could have looked at
the works in these cases the same way as the court in Roulo viewed the
greeting cards:156 that works are protectable due to the original selection
and arrangement of nonprotectable elements. In failing to look at selec-
tion and arrangement, the Olson court explicitly rejected the total con-
cept and feel approach.
In Trust Company Bank v. Putnam Publishing Group Inc.a
5 7 plain-
tiffs brought suit to enjoin distribution of defendant's novel "The Blue
Bicycle," claiming that it infringed the novel "Gone With the Wind," to
which they held the copyright. Again, the court compared theme, plot,
etc. in the extrinsic test. With respect to the intrinsic test, Trust Co. cited
Aliotti for the following proposition:
Nonprotectible [sic] matters in the works, such as ideas, facts and
scenes-a-faire, must be excised before comparing the works as a whole
to judge their total concept and feel .... As applied to dramatic
works, the total concept and feel test can also be described as whether
the ordinary lay observer or audience would immediately recognize a
defendant's movie or book as the "picturization" or "dramatization"
of the plaintiff's book.158
Trust Co. states two approaches to total concept and feel: a true totality
approach and a dissection approach requiring excision of nonprotectable
elements before comparison.
153. 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
154. Id. at 1450-52.
155. Id. at 1453 (quoting Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987)).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
157. 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1874 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
158. Id. at 1878 (quoting Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987); Berkic v.
Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985)).
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Trust Co. cites Aliotti as authority for the use of the dissection ap-
proach, but the Trust Co. restatement of that approach is clearly a mis-
reading of Aliotti. The Aliotti court did not instruct the trier of fact to
excise copyrightable elements from works and then to evaluate the total
concept and feel of what remained. Rather, the Aliotti court found that
no substantial similarity of the works could exist if the only similarities
between them arose from nonprotectable elements. 59 Dicta from Aliotti
implies that, had the court reached the misappropriation test, it would
have applied a total concept and feel analysis. 160
To a certain extent, whether courts take a total concept and feel or
dissection approach doesn't really matter. Application of either ap-
proach seemingly ends up in the same place. Dissection makes sense
when not taken to the extreme of extracting each single word from con-
sideration. Specifically, literary dissection should allow a trier of fact to
compare components of the work, such as plot, theme, dialogue, mood,
and setting, the way a comparison of a musical work would consider
sound, harmony, melody, rhythm, and accompaniment. If the trier of
fact finds that only Judge Hand's "general patterns" are similar, then no
liability should result under the test for misappropriation. As was illus-
trated in Reyher, even when a court purports to apply a total concept and
feel approach, the court looks beyond the nonprotectable plot (overall
feel of the works) and compares specific components.161 Thus, most
courts appear to apply the same sort of analysis despite the cases cited
and language used in their opinions. 62
D. Application of Principles in General
For all the analysis and comparison of cases, general principles are
not easily articulated. Utilizing a true dissection test for any type of
work does not seem to make sense. Individual musical notes or words
are not copyrightable. Nor are most individual visual features (a cum-
merbund itself is not protectable, but a cummerbund worn by a human-
sized hamburger no doubt is). On the other hand, the application of an
overly simplistic total concept and feel approach may result in finding
infringement more often than is warranted.
The best approach is a modified dissection. Such an approach ex-
159. Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987).
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
162. Although in Turner v. Century House Publishing Co., 290 N.Y.S.2d 637, 646 (1968), the
court really missed the boat by holding that copying of an entire chapter of a book did not constitute
infringement.
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amines different components of individual works, with the level of dissec-
tion varying based on the type of work examined. Imagine a spectrum
with complete dissection on one end and total concept and feel on the
other. For visual factual works and works of nonfiction, dissection
should be thorough, protecting only original features. Extending protec-
tion too far for such works would take too much away from the public
domain. In contrast, musical works, works of fiction, and non-naturalis-
tic visual works should be judged with an approach more like total con-
cept and feel. These types of works allow for much latitude in
expression, and if two such works are very similar, the reason is not lack
of choice in expression.
For the most part, courts appear to get it right despite the various
nomenclature they employ. 163 The courts tend to treat works of nonfic-
tion and "factual visual works" similarly, by being more vigorous in the
dissection analysis and being less likely to extend protection to those
works. Of the cases researched for this Note, only those involving non-
fiction and "factual visual works" took a dissection approach, with the
exception of one fictional work and one borderline naturalistic/fantasy
work. 164 The fictional works and works not based on realistic representa-
tions used a dissection approach, which leaned toward total concept and
feel, with the exception of one borderline "factual" visual work. 165 Even
163. See Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Alotti but
applying a modified dissection test); Trust Co. Bank v. Putnam Publishing Group Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1874, 1878 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (quoting Krofft for total concept and feel and Allotti for dissec-
tion, then applying an audience recognition test); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags &
Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165, 1179 (D. Mass. 1989) (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600 (Ist Cir. 1988), for dissection, but applying total concept and feel).
164. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989) (date books);
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988) (naturalistic
animal figures); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985)
(catalog); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983) (action figures);
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1981) (stuffed snowman); Conan
Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (comic book character and super-
hero muscleman action doll); Farmers Indep. Tel. Co. v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. Wis.
1986) (telephone directories).
The exceptions are: Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987) (stuffed dinosaur at
issue); Trust Co. Bank v. Putnam Publishing Group Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1874 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (case involving the fictional work "The Blue Bicycle," where the court misread the holding in
AliottO.
165. See Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1991); Roulo v. Russ Berrie &
Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); Olson v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cit.
1987); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985);
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); Atari, Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982);
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976);
Recycled Paper Prods., Inc. v. Pat Fashions Indus., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Flag
Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Mass. 1989); Cory
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the cases seemingly misled by Aliotti or Concrete Machinery utilized the
total concept and feel approach appropriate for fictional and creative
works not constrained by naturalistic limitations.1 "6
V. CONCLUSION
The courts are split as to whether they cite a total concept and feel
approach or a dissection approach in their determination of misappropri-
ation. Complete dissection never seems to be used. Doing so would lead
to the absurd result of not having anything left of the work to protect.
Overall, two broad approaches, using a less basic level of dissection, are
employed. When assessing works that are either compilations, works of
nonfiction, or visual works depicting realistic subjects, a stricter dissec-
tion is used. A more relaxed dissection approach, nearing total concept
and feel, is used to evaluate works of fiction, fabric designs, and works
with room for much latitude of expression. However, Professor Nimmer
has suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in Feist dictates applica-
tion of a dissection approach for all works. 167
In Feist, the Court eliminated all material not subject to copyright
from the substantial similarity determination. As a result, it appeared
that defendant had taken only uncopyrightable material from plaintiff.
The result is rational and in accordance with copyright law. Professor
Nimmer takes this reasoning a step further, however,.stating:
In the wake of Feist, [dissection] should be considered not only of fac-
tual compilations and computer programs, but across the gamut of
copyright law: to determine whether the similarity between plaintiff's
and defendant's work is substantial, the comparison should not include
unoriginal elements of plaintiff's work; rather, the comparison should
take place after filtering out of the analysis elements of plaintiff's work
that are not protectable.
16
The problem with Professor Nimmer's observation is that Feist was
decided on narrow grounds. The Court found that defendant had not
taken any protectable material from plaintiff.16 9 This Note addresses the
Van Rijn, Inc. v. California Raisin Advisory Bd., 697 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Kenbrooke
Fabrics, Inc. v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 151 (S.DN.Y. 1984); Lauratex Textile Corp. v.
Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The exception is: Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966) (twelve inch
fashion doll at issue).
166. See Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); Flag Fables, Inc. v.
Jean Ann's Country Flags and Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Mass. 1989); Trust Co. Bank v.
Putnam Publishing Group Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1874 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
167. See NIMMER, supra note 12, § 13.03[E][1][b], at 13-78.4 (discussing Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 . CL 1282 (1991)).
168. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
169. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. CL 1282 (1991).
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situation in which a defendant takes both protectable and nonprotectable
elements from a plaintiff's work. Whether the narrow holding in Feist
would apply to such cases is not yet clear.
On the other hand, substantial similarity is a creature of confusion.
If a treatise as illustrious as Nimmer on Copyright entertains the possibil-
ity that the holding in Feist will impact the misappropriation issue, such
impact is certainly possible. As a result, the courts will move from quot-
ing Krojft as authority for the total concept and feel approach to quoting
Feist as authority for the dissection approach. In any event, the courts
will no doubt continue to take the same, rational approach taken now.

